Dutch Expert Warns of Hidden American Control Over European Digital Infrastructure
Netherlands, Saturday, 10 January 2026.
Cybersecurity specialist Elcke Vels reveals striking data showing two-thirds of European NATO weapons imports come from America, while billions rely on Gmail and other US platforms daily. Her provocative analysis suggests adding American flags to email services and defense systems to make this dependency visible, challenging Europe’s digital sovereignty as the continent grapples with balancing international cooperation against potential foreign influence over critical infrastructure and national security systems.
The Invisible Infrastructure Dependencies
Elcke Vels, DATA+ expert at IO+ based in the Netherlands, published her analysis on January 9, 2026, using a compelling metaphor to illustrate Europe’s digital dependency [1]. Just as fresh snow makes footprints visible on the ground, Vels argues that European reliance on American technology has become so normalized that it remains largely invisible to policymakers and citizens alike [1]. Her column in the ‘What if…’ series presents a thought experiment: what if Gmail displayed an American flag, Netflix showed stars and stripes before every show, and Dutch military weapons bore visible US insignia [1][4]? The goal is not to shame these dependencies but to make them transparent for informed decision-making [1].
Defense Dependency Reaches Two-Thirds of Imports
The scale of European military dependence on American technology is striking. Between 2020 and 2024, approximately two-thirds of weapons imported by European NATO countries originated from the United States [1][4]. This dependency extends beyond hardware to encompass the digital systems that control these weapons, raising questions about who ultimately controls the rules governing these critical defense technologies [1]. Vels notes that Europe can barely guarantee its own security without American military support, highlighting a fundamental vulnerability in European strategic autonomy [4]. The implications extend beyond immediate security concerns to long-term questions about technological sovereignty and decision-making independence [1].
Digital Services Create Billions of Dependencies Daily
The civilian digital landscape reveals equally extensive American influence. Gmail alone serves approximately 1.8 billion active users worldwide, representing a massive daily dependency on American digital infrastructure [1][4]. Europeans routinely use Microsoft Teams for business communications, stream American content on Netflix, and consume American fast food, creating multiple touchpoints with US-controlled systems throughout their daily lives [1]. Vels questions who sets the rules for these systems and who has access to the vast amounts of personal and professional data flowing through them [1]. These dependencies have become so seamlessly integrated into European life that their strategic implications often remain unconsidered [1].
The Broader European Digital Sovereignty Challenge
Vels’ analysis arrives as European institutions grapple with broader questions of digital sovereignty and regulatory control. The European Commission recently imposed a €120 million fine on X (formerly Twitter) under the Digital Services Act, marking the first major financial sanction under legislation described as ‘the new constitution for the internet in Europe’ [3][6]. This action demonstrates Europe’s attempt to assert regulatory authority over American tech platforms, with the conflict centering on who sets rules in the digital sphere: democratically elected European legislators or commercial companies from the United States [3][6]. The timing of Vels’ commentary on January 9, 2026, coincides with increasing European focus on maintaining digital autonomy while benefiting from global technological innovation [1].
Balancing Global Cooperation with Strategic Independence
Vels explicitly argues against autarky, supporting a global economy where each country excels in specific areas [1][4]. However, she cautions against ‘blindly relinquishing control over crucial matters’ such as weapons systems and energy infrastructure [1][4]. Her analysis suggests that making dependencies visible through symbolic markers like flags could help Europeans make more informed decisions about which technologies warrant domestic alternatives and which can safely remain sourced internationally [1]. This approach acknowledges the benefits of international cooperation while maintaining awareness of potential vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems [1]. The challenge for European policymakers lies in distinguishing between acceptable interdependence and problematic dependency in an interconnected global economy [1].